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Social Perception of Systemic Risks
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1

The article distinguishes between two types of risks: conventional and systemic risks. Conventional risks can be contained in space and time, follow linear cause–effect relationships and
can be addressed with effective and pointed interventions into the cause–effect chain. Systemic risks, however, are characterized by high complexity, transboundary effects, stochastic
relationships, nonlinear cause–effect patterns with tipping points, and are often associated
with less public attention than they require. The article addresses the reasons why systemic
risks seem to be attenuated in public perception. The article goes on to consider how the
social amplification of risk framework is useful in the context of systemic risks and describes
needed extensions of that framework. It identifies practical tools for assessing the significance
of perceptions for systemic risk situations. Finally, it argues that a graphic representation and
simulation of evolving systemic risks and potential countermeasures as well as a participatory deliberative approach of inclusive risk governance are suitable governance strategies for
preventing, mitigating, or managing systemic risks.
KEY WORDS: Inclusive risk governance; risk perception; social amplification/attenuation of risk; systemic risks

1.

INTRODUCTION

At first glance, risk analysis is a success story.
Many risks, for example, occupational health risks
and risks related to transportation and mobility,
which had threatened human well-being to a large
extent during the past decades, have been identified
and reduced significantly (Renn, 2014). Along with
medical advances, risk analysis has been successful
in developing public regulations and institutions that
have been able to reduce risk so considerably that
most countries in the world still experience increasing life expectancy from one year to the next. Between 2000 and 2016, global life expectancy at birth,
for both sexes combined, increased by 5.5 years, from
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66.5 to 72.0 years (World Health Organization, 2019,
p. 2). Conventional risks are regulated within a specific regime that can be contained in time and space
and linked to a specific sector. Consequentially, casualties related to occupational risks, car accidents,
technological incidents, or other safety failures decreased significantly. The largest declines in risk exposure from 2010 to 2019 were among a set of risks
that are strongly linked to improvements in social
and economic development as well as more effective regulation concerning, for example, household
air pollution and unclean drinking water. Global declines also occurred for tobacco smoking and lead exposure (Abbafati et al., 2020).
Despite these successes, many individuals have
come to believe that risks have increased in number
and severity, making life more dangerous (Sadiq,
Tharp, Graham, & Tyler, 2016). Despite increasing
life expectancy worldwide, studies indicate that individuals are concerned about risks that harm only
a relatively small number of people (e.g., crimes
committed by refugees and chemical residue in
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foodstuffs) while disregarding other risks that affect
a large number of people (e.g., lifestyle risks such
as smoking and sunbathing) (Ropeik, 2010, p. 68ff.;
Renn, 2014, p. 143). Risk perception and empirical
evidence seems to be at odds. This discrepancy has
been termed the risk paradox (Renn, 2014).
This paradox has been thoroughly investigated
and empirical studies have revealed many qualitative
attributes, such as voluntariness and perceived dreadfulness, that impact risk perception in addition to perceived magnitude and probability (reviews in: Breakwell, 2014, p. 20f.; Gardner, 2009, p. 70f.; Siegrist &
Arvai, 2020). However, in our view, the paradox may
also be triggered by another aspect: complex causal
structures and cascading effects of risk creating ripple effects from one domain to other domains (Lucas,
Renn, & Jaeger, 2018). Familiar procedures of risk assessment and risk management have resulted in major risk reductions with respect to conventional risks.
However, these procedures are not sufficient for handling risks that transgress domain boundaries, that
are embedded in a complex relationship with socioecological, sociotechnical, or cultural transformations,
and that tend to lead to a series of secondary and tertiary impacts. Those risks provide a major challenge
for scientific methods of risk assessments as well as
measures for risk management and regulation. They
have been subsumed under the category “systemic
risks.” Systemic risks are complex, transboundary,
and nonlinear risk phenomena with potential tipping
points (Renn, Lucas, Haas, & Jaeger, 2017). They are
likely to cause cascading events that lead to negative
effects across various societal domains (Kaufman &
Scott, 2003). This feature has been particularly highlighted by analysts of the financial market and its collapse in 2008 (Liow, Liao, & Huang, 2018). Part of
the challenge is that there is also often a lag in public
perceptions and regulatory effort, despite the potential devastating effects of systemic risks (Schweizer,
2021).
The original motivation for developing the social
amplification of risk framework (SARF) came from
observations that gaps between public perceptions
of risk and expert perceptions based on empirical
measures have practical consequences (Kasperson
et al., 1988; Pidgeon, Kasperson, & Slovic, 2003). According to the SARF, reduced or attenuated perceptions of risk may impede risk management, leading
to heightened (amplified) empirical risks that can be
measured quantitatively. Similarly, heightened (amplified) perceptions may also interfere with risk management, causing new risks to emerge. This article
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outlines the dynamic processes of social perception
of systemic risks and investigates the reasons for a
lack of attention to systemic risks by policymakers
and the public; in the language of social amplification, we intend to demonstrate that perceptions of
systemic risks are more likely to be attenuated than
amplified. This attenuation may result in an amplification of risks as measured empirically, for example,
current climate change mitigation efforts are inadequate for meeting the Paris Agreement temperature
goals while climate engineering techniques cannot be
relied on to contribute significantly toward meeting
these goals (Lawrence et al., 2018). Attenuation of
systemic risks goes beyond reductions in affect, that
is, the level of concern that people have. There will
also be difficulty and divergence in people’s defining
or framing of a systemic risk. Such divergence will
weaken public support of regulatory effort. The article argues that a graphic representation and simulation of evolving systemic risks can be a useful tool
for better understanding the impact and likely consequences of systemic risks. Gaming tools and virtual
simulations are also excellent instruments for informing a participatory deliberative approach of inclusive risk governance (Gordon & Manosevitch, 2010;
Gupta, Bouvier, & Gordon, 2012).
2.

SYSTEMIC RISKS

Systemic risks are characterized by five attributes
(Schweizer, 2021). Each of these attributes needs
to be met to some degree to make a risk systemic,
yet one attribute can partially compensate for the
other. The distinction between conventional and systemic risks is not clear cut, it is rather a continuum
than a distinctive binary relationship: however, for
a risk to be called systemic it must meet the conditions of demonstrating high complexity with respect to causal or functional relationships, high dependency on contextual factors, and being associated
with cascading impacts within the domain in which
the risk is located and beyond this domain (ripple effects) (Renn et al., 2020). These ripple effects illustrate the link to the framework of social amplification of risk, which focuses on amplification and attenuation processes beyond the subsystem in which the
risk originated (Renn, Burns, Kasperson, Kasperson,
& Slovic, 1992). The multitude of intervening variables between causes and effects make it very difficult to reconstruct causalities, to understand triggers, consequences, feedback loops, and impacts of
systemic risks (Lucas et al., 2018; Renn et al., 2017).
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Complexity gives rise to an entanglement of intervening factors that interact with each other, that reinforce each other, and attenuate or amplify the given
causal relationships. This level of complexity creates uncertainty beyond the usual level associated
with statistical confidence intervals. Identical causes
may lead to different effects, depending on the initial situation of a systemic risk. This feature is known
from multiagent, multimoderator risks such as the effects of chemical mixes on human health (National
Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine,
2017). Furthermore, with systemic risks, there is high
uncertainty about both magnitude and probability of
expected adverse effects. Probabilities and distributions of occurrences often shift rapidly which makes
it difficult to extrapolate from past distributions to
future events.
Systemic risks are transboundary or crosssectoral. They may originate in the environment,
human-made systems, or biological systems, yet their
ripple effects spread out toward other systems where
they have an impact to a greater or lesser extent (Aven & Renn, 2019). The cascading effects
of systemic risks can cut across national as well as
sectoral boundaries, possibly increasing in intensity
and impact. Systemic risks can transcend boundaries
of jurisdiction, nationality, or sectoral responsibility
and therefore often call for multilevel governance
(Hooghe & Marks, 2001, 2003) and international cooperation. The COVID-19 pandemic demonstrates
these transboundary effects of systemic risks rather
well.
In addition, many systemic risks come along
with tipping points or tipping corridors. The system
changes irreversibly once a tipping point has been
reached. These changes in condition may even include a complete collapse of the system (Lenton
et al., 2008). The developments leading up to a
tipping point are incremental and often go undetected. Human learning processes are not well suited
for dealing with tipping points. Humans learn from
past experience based on trial and error (Anderson, 1993). However, once a tipping point has been
reached it is too late to adapt and reverse the consequences. Useful learning needs to happen before a
tipping point will be reached despite weak feedback
signals.
In essence, there is little scientific uncertainty
and ambiguity about the conventional aspects of risks
such as they appear with localized pollution and contained technological failures that are by now well understood by risk analysts and managers. There are
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suitable and effective risk management and governance instruments available to prevent, reduce, or
mitigate these risks. That does not mean that these instruments are used and implemented worldwide, but
they are available in principle and haven been proven
to be effective. The systemic aspects of risks, however, are more difficult to assess due to their complex nature and interactions with multiple other risks
and socioeconomic activities. We still lack a clear understanding of how to address, manage, and govern
these risks mainly because they transcend the sectoral policy tradition and there is a lack of management knowledge about the effectiveness, efficiency,
resilience, and fairness of the consequences associated with potential policy interventions and we still
face problems communicating both the nature and
the urgency of these systemic risks to policymakers
and the public.
3.

PERCEPTIONS OF SYSTEMIC RISKS

People’s response to a risk will depend considerably on their perception of the risk. One factor
that influences people’s perceptions is their capacity and capability for risk mitigation or adaptation.
Risk perceptions can be amplified or attenuated due
to a variety of factors such as perceived dreadfulness, familiarity, or lack of controllability (Breakwell,
2014; Renn et al., 1992; Siegrist & Arvai, 2020; Slovic,
1987). These qualitative risk factors, that is, attributes
that people associate with risks, may lead in combination with intuitive heuristics and biases to a disconnect between people’s concern about risks and their
potential impact measured by statistical or experimental analysis (Raue & Scholl, 2018; Ropeik, 2010;
Siegrist & Arvai, 2020). People tend to overrate risks
that are readily available in their memory (availability bias), that are associated with positive or negative
emotions (affect heuristics), that confirm what the
already believe (confirmation bias), that lend themselves to blame others for its occurrence (blame), and
that are associated with immediate dreadful consequences (dread) (Siegrist & Arvai, 2020; Slovic, Finucane, Peters, & MacGregor, 2004).
Conventional risks are sometimes socially amplified, sometimes attenuated depending on the perceived qualitative risk characteristics but systemic
risks tend to be systematically attenuated in risk perception. One reason is that individuals draw on cultural memories of hazards and perils encountered by
previous generations, such as openly visible markers for previous flood levels or landmarks reminding
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people of historical disasters. Stories of these perils
are passed on and are readily available in our memories. Many of the factors that impact judgments about
conventional risks are linked to risk characteristics
that people have learned in the course of becoming
familiar with the causes of risk, such as fire, explosion, floods, or technical failures (Ewald, 1999).
Systemic risks, however, refer to potential events
in the future. People might experience the impacts
of these risks only after passing a tipping point; even
then, the experience itself is likely to be primarily
about the impacts rather than the systemic connections that brought them about. Before a tipping point
the risks will appear more distant and less dangerous
to the individual person (optimism bias) than many
conventional risks. In particular, they are less easily
understood and, due to their complexity and nonlinearity, less present in the mental representation of
most people (Nahari, Glicksohn, & Nachson, 2010).
Some of the key features of systemic risks, such as
complexity as well as nonlinearity and stochasticity
give rise to a feeling of lacking agency (Smith &
Mayer, 2018) or being trapped in the dilemma of the
commons (Renn, 2011).
Even though systemic risks can threaten the
functionality of society’s vital systems, individuals
are likely to perceive less urgency to change their
own behavior or to accept more stringent regulatory actions. Fatalist perceptions appear to be more
common than in other risk areas (Mayer & Smith,
2019). At the societal and policy level, perceptual
complexity and the diversity that people show in
framing systemic risks, as well as their diversity in
levels of concern, will create incoherence that might
reduce further any urgency toward control efforts.
In the remainder of this section the ways in which
public perceptions and behaviors are affected by the
characteristics of systemic risks will be explored. In
this section an expanded social amplification of risk
framework will be used to seek a better understanding of how policy formation is affected both by system complexity directly and by its indirect effects on
perceptions and behavior.
3.1.

Counterintuitive Causal Connections

Individuals intuitively associate causality
strongly with proximity in time and space (Michotte, 1963). This makes sense from an evolutionary
point of view. Cause and effect are temporally and
spatially related in the case of most conventional
risks. Causality is immediate and for this reason less

challenging to ascertain with occupational hazards,
car accidents, and natural hazards. Risk perception
is therefore primed on proximity or relatedness
(Renn, 2019, p. 47). The systemic risks caused by
interdependencies in complex coupled systems are
more difficult to fathom. In this case, causality is
obfuscated by the multitude of intermediary factors
and a lack of predictability in their relationships.
Causes and effects are disconnected in space and
time (Markowitz & Shariff, 2012, p. 244). It is hard
for most individuals to relate their personal experience and behavior to systemic risks. For instance,
CO2 emissions caused by private transportation in
Germany may increase the risk of extreme weather
events in places that are far away from the original source, such as Bangladesh. In combination
with sea-level rise these events will eventually displace millions of people (Seneviratne et al., 2012).
However, these effects are temporally and spatially
unrelated to personal experience. How can people
feel responsible for events that will happen far away
in the (probably not so distant) future? These complex relationships lack plausibility and tangibility.
Populists and other climate change sceptics take advantage of the seemingly implausibility of complex
relationships. They offer simple explanations based
on common sense reasoning and/or refer to powerful
actors behind the scenes (McIntyre, 2018, p. 127f.).
Conspiracy theories can seem more straight forward
and plausible compared with scientific evidence that
points toward a multitude of interconnected climate
change triggers.
3.2.

Nonlinearity and Stochasticity

The second reason for attenuation is due to
the nature of complex and stochastic relationships.
Deterministic relationships that follow the pattern
“If A then B (and nothing else),” thus establishing
clear causal connections between drivers and consequences, are rare to find in the context of systemic risks. Probability distributions of outcomes
may be modeled to represent the potential effects
of drivers. However, stochastic relationships are difficult to communicate to the public appropriately,
and the challenge is even greater when potential outcomes are delayed or when systems may change drastically due to tipping points (Dutt & Gonzales, 2010;
Leiserowitz, 2005). The challenge is to communicate the innate uncertainties associated with stochastic and dynamic effects without giving the impression that truth claims are arbitrary or due to partisan
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interests. The negative effect might occur that
individuals interpret uncertainties associated with
stochasticity as ignorance and fall back on their intuition (Breakwell, 2014, p. 86ff.). This tendency is
encouraged by the political instrumentalization of
constructivist approaches to science by populist and
fringe movements (Gardner, 2009; Urbinati, 2019).
Constructivism claims that knowledge and truth
claims, in as far as they refer to knowledge, are the
product of social learning via interaction and communication. In its most pronounced variation, the
paradigm postulates that knowledge formation does
not require external stimuli from the natural environment, rather that social interaction is the sole input
for knowledge formation. This claim can be twisted
and instrumentalized to cause irritation about due
scientific practice so that science seems susceptible to
be influenced by partisan interests (McIntyre, 2018,
p. 128ff.). However, communication must find ways
for communicating the essence of stochasticity, that
is, that scientific truth claims are neither arbitrary nor
representations of wishful thinking; rather their lack
of certainty in predictions demonstrates the complexity of the phenomena under investigation (Fischhoff
& Davis, 2014).
Furthermore, stochastic modeling can impact
perceptions of the seriousness of risk in different
ways. In the face of uncertainty, some individuals may
take an optimistic view and turn a blind eye toward
adverse effects that may happen; others, more pessimistic, may fear the worst. It is a claim often made
against climate change mitigation that scientific proof
is lacking for the anthropogenic causes of climate
change, despite strong evidence supporting the argument (Rosa, Diekmann, Dietz, & Jaeger, 2010).
This may also lead to the conviction that in those
cases in which scientific uncertainty is communicated,
people believe that this is a sign of ignorance or
sloppy science. Faced with uncertainty, many respondents may conclude that scientists are just guessing.
For example, a national U.S. survey found that 47%
of the American public believed that ‘‘it seems like
almost everything causes cancer’’ and 71% agreed
that ‘‘there are so many recommendations about preventing cancer, it’s hard to know which ones to follow’’ (Jensen et al., 2011; Niederdeppe, 2008, p. 488).
These perceptions are based on the impression of
arbitrariness of knowledge claims about risks leading to devaluation of scientific assessment or paralysis due to a lack of confidence in scientific assessments (Maxim, Mansier, & Grabar, 2013). Absolute
certainty is an unattainable and inappropriate ideal
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when faced with stochasticity. Although this insight
is simple, it is challenging to communicate to people
who have been educated to associate scientific evidence with proof confirmed by deterministic natural
laws.
3.3.

Trust in Institutions

Public trust in authorities and institutions has
been identified as a significant precondition for effective risk governance (Earle & Cvetkovich, 2013;
Löfstedt, 2005; Poortinga & Pidgeon, 2003; Siegrist,
2021; Siegrist & Cvetkovich, 2000). Many adverse effects caused by technology or industrialization, such
as the destruction of the ozone layer by chlorofluorocarbons, the effect of greenhouse gas emissions on
climate, or health risks caused by pesticides cannot
be perceived by our senses. Where individuals cannot
rely on personal experience, they need to fall back on
mediated information. In this situation, trust in the
information source and intermediaries is crucial.
Three general strategies can be identified that individuals adopt when personal experience is lacking.
The first strategy is to trust a reference group (Renn,
2005). If people opt for this strategy, they will believe
the truth claims made by this reference group, largely
irrespective of content. “If people trust the industry
or the governmental agencies responsible for regulating a hazard, they may perceive the technology
more positively and as more acceptable compared
with situations where they lack trust” (Siegrist, 2021,
p. 482). However, statistical evidence suggests that
loyalty to established reference groups, in particular mainstream political parties or associations is
decreasing (Lavezzolo & Ramiro, 2017; Mair, 2013;
Pharr, Putnam, & Dalton, 2000). The traditional
loyalty to established groups and parties seems to
become more and more replaced by alliance to
polarized communities that are often supported by
internet platforms (Flaxman, Goel, & Rao, 2016).
This development can also be observed for voting
behavior in Europe and abroad. Established parties
have lost a significant number of core voters and are
now coveting swing voters (Jun & Bukow, 2020). Although trust in science has been steadfast for many
years, this trend also takes in this domain. Trust in
science has become a politized issue, in particular in
the United States. Republicans have been far more
skeptical about trustworthiness of science over the
last decade than democrats. Notably, the gap between political partisans expanded sharply between
2016 and 2018, growing from a five-point gap to an
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11-point gap (Krause, Brossard, Scheufele, Xenos,
& Franke, 2019, p. 819). The impression of general
confidence in science has been replaced in large parts
of the population by cautious skepticism, suspicion,
or outright distrust with respect to the possibility
that scientific institutions deliberately or unwillingly
misinform or misguide public opinions (Hendriks,
Kienhues, & Bromme, 2016). Such suspicions persist
but are less prominent when it comes to research
activities performed by universities; but they are
more pronounced when it comes to industry-related
research (van der Meer, 2017).
Under the condition of being worried about the
impartiality of information concerning risks, individuals may resort to the second strategy, which is general refusal and opting for a zero-risk strategy no
matter the risk or potential countervailing risks (Millstone & van Zwanenberg, 2000; Renn, 2006). As all
statements are allegedly biased by partisan interests,
no one and no institution can be trusted. Consequentially, people tend toward denial and inaction rather
than acting on scientific evidence.
The third strategy involves shifting trust over
time depending on the attractiveness of communication sources (Fjaeran & Aven, 2021). This strategy has been termed reliance on vagabond trust
(Renn, 2005; 2019). According to this strategy, individuals rely on peripheral cues as postulated by
the elaboration-likelihood model of persuasion when
trying to make fast and simple judgments (O’Keefe,
2008, Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). Since they are unable to evaluate the validity of arguments, they look
for other clues that can help them to judge the
credibility of scientific assessments. Those clues include academic titles of experts, elegance of articulation, signs of empathy, or attractive appearance.
For instance, talk shows might be used as an anecdotal illustration for this effect. Many political talk
shows on Western TV follow an established pattern.
They feature a moderator and usually four invited
guests. An industry representative in favor of innovation and technology; their opponent, who is often
an NGO spokesperson; the representative of a regulatory body or agency; and a celebrity representing
the public. Studies indicate that most of the audience cannot remember the arguments that had been
brought forth in the discussion, even if they watch
these shows for information rather than entertainment (Mattheiß et al., 2013). Although they cannot
recall the content, they make inferences about whom
they think trustworthy and whose arguments are believable. The judgement about what might be true or
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false is also driven by the subjective impression that
viewers associate with each participant.
3.4.

Cognitive Dissonance

Vagabond trust is fickle. Individuals may change
their minds often and attribute trustworthiness to
different persons or groups over a short period of
time. This process may cause cognitive dissonance
(originally in Festinger, 1962; Harmon-Jones & Mills,
2019). Cognitive dissonance occurs when individuals
experience psychological stress because they hold
contradictory beliefs. Cognitive dissonance gives
rise to frustration, anxiety, and increasing insecurity. Insecurity leads to heightened risk perception.
Individuals are torn between competing cues that
affect risk ratings. Individuals deal with cognitive
dissonance either by downplaying the conflict and
ignoring the risk or the opposite, paying a lot of
attention to those risks where they perceive conflicts
among the peers to which they relate (for example
tobacco risk perception by smokers and nonsmokers,
see McMaster & Lee, 1991). This may lead to underor overestimating the extent of damage and/or probability occurrence of risks depending on personal
experience and perceived familiarity. This effect can
be observed concerning refugees. Concerns about
refugees and xenophobia tend to increase in cases in
which refugee arrivals are massive but also transient
(Lucas & Renn, 2020). The lack of meaningful interactions with refugees sparks hostility (Hangartner,
Dinas, Marbach, Matakos, & Xefteris, 2019). The
mechanisms of vagabond trust cause situations of
heightened anxiety and may cause a preoccupation
with some highly imaginable but rare conventional
risks and an attenuation of serious but less visible or
definable systemic risks.
3.5.

New Communication Media

People’s perceptions of risk are often generated
and altered by communication. Modes of communicating about risks have changed significantly over the
past few decades due to digital technology (BalogWay, McComas, & Besley, 2020). Digital communication, especially in the social media, differs both
from face-to-face interaction and communication via
conventional media in many ways. One difference
is especially significant for systemic risks. Communication in virtual space makes it easier to avoid the
possibility of experiencing cognitive dissonance than
conventional modes of communication (Donsbach,
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2009). Information can be selected based almost exclusively on one’s own preferences. The algorithms
employed by search engines and social media generate a flood of suggestions that match user preferences and support making knowledge claims without concern for contrary evidence (McIntyre, 2018,
p. 89ff.). Echo chambers offer affirmation and confirmation of existing beliefs so that users may avoid
information that might cause cognitive dissonance
(Farrell, 2015). Conventional media, such as newspapers, and face-to-face interactions, although far from
being unbiased, are less streamlined to support existing beliefs and thus will confront individuals with
opinions, values, and beliefs that differ from their
own. Individuals relying on social media, therefore,
have less incentive to reconsider their positions. Constructive social learning thrives on the respectful exchange and debate of diverging ideas. Under conditions that hinder social learning, diverging beliefs
are considered a threat instead of an opportunity,
leading to increased polarization (Yarchi, Baden, &
Kligler-Vilenchik, 2020). With the selective use of information sources and polarization, groups of people communicate primarily within separate bubbles
while there is only limited communication between
bubbles. The formation of bubbles can be exploited
by individuals and groups who deliberately provide
misinformation to further other purposes.
The dilemma of systemic risks is that coping with
complexity and diverse interests requires effective
negotiation and constructive social learning. However, that same complexity also provides opportunities and incentives to emphasize particular aspects of
systemic risks. Yet different aspects will be of interest
to people with different concerns. The inertia in the
climate change debate is an example. Acceptance or
denial of anthropogenic climate change has become
a matter of almost religious belief in countries where
polarization has taken root (Poortinga, Whitmarsh,
Steg, Böhm, & Fisher, 2019). A similar effect can be
observed in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic
where a variety of conspiracy theories have gained
ground (Collins, Florin, & Renn, 2020).
4.

PROCESSES OF SOCIAL AMPLIFICATION
AND ATTENUATION

The original motivation for developing the
SARF came from empirical observations. In many
contexts there can be large divergence between expert and public perceptions of the nature and/or seriousness of a risk, and, significantly, such divergence
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can impact the risk context by amplifying or attenuating drivers or promoters of risk (Kasperson et al.,
1988; Pidgeon et al, 2003). Both risk amplification,
that is, the magnitude or probability of a risk is either
inflated or particularly emphasized, and attenuation,
that is, the magnitude or probability of risk is either
downplayed or deemphasized in the public debate,
can be observed in actual risk debates (Pidgeon et al.,
2003). The framework was not intended to be an explanatory theory. Instead, it is a conceptual map that
can be used to organize information about these phenomena to gain a better understanding. The framework was also advocated as a heuristic tool for developing research designs, including hypotheses and
variable selection (Renn, 1991).
In its simplest expression, SARF draws attention to three aspects of risk dynamics: perceptions
of risk, how communication (as well as communication strategies and communication channels) affects
perceptions and responses, and how perceptions and
communication affect risk management and shape
the potential nature and likelihood of consequences
(see Fig. 1). The consequences may relate directly to
the risk or to its potential secondary or tertiary effects.
Already in its original formulation SARF anticipated two key aspects of systemic risks: (1) the possibility of feedbacks—that risk management could be
affected by changes in perception influenced by earlier management activities; and (2) multiple connections giving rise to secondary and tertiary risks. Subsequent work has revealed another systemic aspect,
the complexity and multiple linkages attendant on
communication (Sword-Daniels et al., 2018).
These aspects are important, yet they do not provide the full story for relating SARF to systemic risks.
Two general questions arise: How can SARF be helpful in the analysis of systemic risks? And how can
the characterization of systemic risks inform and help
guide the further development of the SARF? Answering the second question is essential to answering the first. The formulations of SARF to date have
focused on what happens after an initial event that
might serve as a signal. However, the complexities in
systems imply that it is not realistic to consider initial events in isolation. The connections with other
parts of the system and what is happening in these
other parts will strongly influence the subsequent social process. Context matters! Guidance for expanding the focus can be found by looking more closely
at the two analogies that inspired the original SARF:
the picture of spreading ripples in a pond from an

15396924, 2022, 7, Downloaded from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/risa.13831 by Clark University, Wiley Online Library on [09/12/2022]. See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions) on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons License

Social Perception of Systemic Risks

Schweizer, Goble, and Renn

Fig 1. Social amplification and attenuation of risk framework (simplified version based on Kasperson & Kasperson, 1996; Kasperson et al.,
1988)

initial event (a dropped stone in the analogy) and an
electronic amplifier of a sound system processing an
audio signal.
In the original version of the ripple analogy and
in much of the follow up the picture was of signals expanding outward (Kasperson et al., 1988). An event
could serve as a signal like a rock dropping into a
pool. There was also an implicit context to the picture: the image evoked was a still pond (perhaps at
dawn or dusk). All was quiet until the event and then
we looked for the outward spreading ripples causing direct effects and, as a consequence of these effects, secondary and tertiary impacts. A similar expanding outward outlook was attached to the electronic amplifier analogy. An initial signal was filtered
and modulated; it then was distributed as various outputs that were then listened to, interpreted, and, possibly, acted upon. The challenge for the risk community posed by these two analogies was to learn how
such signals get filtered and modulated, transmitted,
and interpreted under different conditions in different settings (Renn, 1991).
Once we think more comprehensively about systems, however, we need to take account of feedback
mechanisms and activity in other parts of the system. The ripples do not just spread outward, they
encounter barriers and reflected ripples return. In
a complex system, there can be many barriers with
differing reflective effects (Cairney, 2012). One can
imagine instead of a pristine pool with neat bor-

ders, a swampy pond with tree stumps and fallen
branches and some rocks and muddy islands. Ripples will travel complex paths. We can extend this
image further: the pond is very rarely still; breezes
or winds will produce waves; a frog or a fish might
jump and cause a splash; there might even be rain; we
must not expect to deal only with single events and
their ripple pathways; other events, creating other
ripple patterns, will occur in the swamp at roughly the
same time; the ripples that we will see will be from
the interacting patterns of ripples from many sources
shaped by the many irregularities in the swamp. In
such settings, there are the further challenges of characterizing the background in which signals might appear, characterizing the interactions which will alter
signals, and considering how the altered signals will
be interpreted when they appear amidst numerous
other signals. In the next section we consider tools
to aid in doing so.
What guidance does a systemic risk perspective
offer for further development of SARF? As suggested by our reimagining the pond and electronic
amplifier analogies, the primary contribution will be
to support a conceptual shift that will pay close attention to the systemic context in which social amplification and attenuation occurs and to the diversity of framings of risk that can ensue. As we discuss in the next section, analytic tools from systemic
risk analysis (especially the decision landscapes from
the human side of systemic risk) will be helpful in
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supporting this change in focus. The first step is to
develop capabilities for characterizing the systems,
the information processing nodes, the communications links, and the relationships of different actors
with and influences on each other.
Another step will be developing capabilities for
assessing ongoing patterns of communication, and
in what parts of the system do what kinds of information get reinforced, suppressed, ignored, or distorted. The COVID-19 pandemic is a good example
where even fairly simple messages about social or
physical distancing were either taken extremely seriously, traded off against other risks such as economic
losses, repelled as not credible, repressed as not relevant, simply ignored or transposed into one of the
popular conspiracy theories (Cori, Bianchi, Cadum,
& Anthonj, 2020). In this respect, the role of algorithms in communication platforms in shaping patterns of communication merits more study. More attention to the system context would also be useful
to develop a better understanding of how group processes shape individual perceptions and how people
balance their use of multiple modes of communication (Krause, Freiling, Beets, & Brossard, 2020). Diversity matters: different people and different groups
behave differently, and communicate through different channels, so there will be differing kinds of patterns and balances. Dynamics also matter: all configurations and responses will likely change over time
(Horlick-Jones, Sime, & Pidgeon, 2003).
How will an enlarged SARF improve our understanding of systemic risks? From the beginning
SARF was conceived as an approach to integrating
social science insights about human perceptions,
communication, and responses with technological information about risks. The links between the entities
that comprise systems of concern are, more often
than not, communication links. And the behavior
of the entities over time and their responsiveness is
shaped by individual and organizational characteristics, knowledge but also perceptions, purposes, and
values. The SARF offers an integrative approach
to these characteristics. Furthermore, the SARF
encourages attention to the role of information and
misinformation in system dynamics (see study on
social media amplification by Ng, Yang, & Vishwanath, 2018). Hazards are threats to humans and,
notably, things they value. Traditionally hazards have
been associated with events that release energy or
materials. These releases, perhaps modified as they
travel, and contingent on the exposure of people
or their assets, can directly cause harms of various
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sorts; there can be further knock-on harms arising
from the original damage (Kates, Hohenemser, &
Kasperson, 1985). However, early on it has been
recognized (see for instance Graham & Kasperson,
1985) that releases (or suppression) of information
could also cause harm. Harm could come directly
from trauma or other mental pain or from stigma;
it could come indirectly from causing individuals or
institutions to act in harmful ways or to fail to take
necessary actions. The SARF applies to releases (and
suppression), transmission and transformation, and
exposure to, interpretation, and use of information.
It is concerned with direct and indirectly caused
harm and with secondary and tertiary consequences.
Among the consequences can be effects from actions
(or failures to act) that lead to exposure to energy
or materials. A famous example from the 1930s and
1940s was flood control efforts in the Midwest of the
United States. The information that massive efforts
at flood control had successfully controlled normal
floods sparked migration into flood plains, and total
flood losses (that came from abnormally large floods)
rose (Burton, Kates, & White, 1968).
There are obstacles to including social amplification in assessments. One obstacle is analytical difficulty. We have already noted that systemic risks
are challenging. Indeed, they are impossible to assess fully. Social amplification/attenuation only adds
to the challenge. We thus need new analytic tools
to guide assessments (McMillan & Overall, 2016).
The second obstacle is institutional. There is little demand for assessments of complex systems with wideranging ramifications and there is a natural resistance
to the kind of institutional self-reflection that will
be needed for assessing social amplification impacts
(Goble, Bier, & Renn, 2018). Despite these obstacles
there are good reasons to incorporate social amplification in risk assessment, provided the needed capabilities for understanding amplification processes, for
assessing them, and for creating management tools to
influence the processes are developed. Human and
organizational behavior is at the root of most systemic risks and human and organizational behavior
is shaped by social amplification/attenuation.
5.

THE WAY FORWARD: TOOLS AND
APPROACHES

The human dimension of systemic risks consists
of many different actors (organizations or individuals) pursuing a variety of activities and interacting
with each other. The actors differ in their purposes,
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their capabilities, their knowledge, and their concerns. The nature of their interactions also has great
variety. There are communication links and, sometimes, material ones; there may be strong or weak
influences; some connections are formal and legally
defined; others are informal. Such complexity is a bar
to predictive analysis. Conventional risk assessments
may be useful, but only in describing pieces of the
system. A similar limitation applies to the use of conventional risk management approaches.
From that perspective, an approach to assessment, management, and governance should have two
aspects: (1) capabilities for identifying when and
how to use effectively conventional risk assessment
and management approaches; (2) capabilities for responding to system complexities where conventional
approaches will be inadequate (Renn et al., 2020).
New tools will be needed to support both aspects.
Such tools should incorporate and further develop insights from the SARF. Assessment tools are needed
to help actors better understand the potential impacts from their position in the larger system, to determine when conventional approaches are appropriate and when they are not, and to identify when and
where opportunities might be found to gain help and
reduce harm from activities in other parts of the system. Because of predictive intractability, the focus
should be primarily on risk characterization in support of adaptive approaches to management. Adaptive approaches in turn will require management to
have sufficient flexibility to make their efforts adaptable (Klinke & Renn, 2012). When broader system
activities are in play, actors must learn to marshal
their capabilities for influencing other parts of the
system to help. Effective governance will require capabilities for taking broad views of system interactions and the nature of influences.
In this context three descriptive tools promise
to improve assessment of systemic risks. In all three,
there is both the opportunity and the need to consider social amplification/attenuation phenomena,
namely, altered perceptions of risk, the multiplicity of
communication channels and distortions in communications, and effects on responses. The tools are still
in development; they have been considered mostly
for use by experts, that is, the analysts who perform
assessments, but, as shall be mentioned in the next
section, they have potential for use also in participatory processes in support of governance efforts.
The first of the tools is “decision landscapes”
(Blowers, 2007; Webler, Tuler, Goble, & Schweizer,
2015). The idea is to create a picture showing the vari-

Schweizer, Goble, and Renn
ous actors and their direct connections (influences) as
a network. Such pictures should be considered fluid,
subject to change as information is acquired or discarded and shaped to the situation of concern. While
the first sketch of a landscape might map stakeholders and their interactions, the tool is intended to collect and organize more information. Like a geoinformation system assemblage of layers, the landscape
will contain additional information about the actors
and their mutual influences such as their capabilities
for actions or effects, their goals and incentives, their
use of communication channels and the nature of
those channels, their knowledge, vulnerabilities, and
values. The objective is not to model but, in support
of risk characterization, to provide a map, a guide, to
help identify opportunities for managing particular
risks and to identify for whom and how assessments
could be useful. Thus, analysis of actor networks in
interconnected complex systems is a key objective
for systemic risk analysis (Helbing, 2013). A further
objective is to identify the system vulnerabilities and
opportunities for coordination and/or collaboration
that lie in the realm of risk governance. Critical information pertaining to social amplification will be included within the layered categories (1) by including
perceptions as an important aspect of knowledge; (2)
by observing communication as a type of influence
and communication channels as patterns of linkage;
(3) by noting that having triggers for deciding to respond (or not to respond) is among the capabilities
for action. With such information available, it should
be possible in particular cases to identify situations in
which social amplification phenomena are likely to
have significant influence and to make some assessment of the nature of the influence.
The second tool is boundary analysis, the systematic examination of the choices (explicit and implicit)
made in an analysis (Mattor et al., 2014). Choices are
inevitable; when everything is connected to everything else, the system is too complicated to describe,
let alone analyze. One set of choices is which actors
and which links between them to include. Further
choices will be what properties are mapped in various layers. A risk analysis may limit the choices even
more by characterizing some potential contributions
to risk as too insignificant to consider or by making
exclusions based on other reasons (for instance, the
risk contribution is too difficult to estimate, or is not
acceptable to talk about). A boundary analysis will
not provide a guarantee against including too much
or too little for the desired assessment. But acknowledging the importance of care in boundary definition,
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recognizing that many choices are made implicitly,
and making a formal effort to examine the choices
can substantially improve choices. The boundary analytic task is to make explicit what is included, what is
not, and why. We can also consider “soft” boundaries.
These can be tentative exclusions for which a limited
analysis might give conditions for revisiting the exclusion. There can be different reasons for an analyst’s
choices for what to exclude from an analysis. Some
possibilities are, “didn’t think about it,” “don’t know
enough,” “considered it unimportant,” “considered
it not responsive to someone’s concerns,” or “considered it important, but chose to address it separately.”
Boundary analysis can provide a framework for explicitly considering the inclusion or exclusion of social amplification ramifications in a risk analysis and
for assessing the implications of the choice in terms
of the types of risks considered and how much of the
system gets considered.
The third tool is identifying and characterizing
conceptual gateways or entry points. A gateway (entry point) focuses attention on the space between
conceptual realms that are usually considered in isolation (for a generic discussion about gateways to
empirical studies see Blaikie & Priest, 2019). While
there can be a variety of reasons for isolation, the
most common reason is specialization, that is, scientific disciplines claiming particular topics or methodologies as their area of expertise. Medicine and public
health are riddled with such specialization and thus
offer many opportunities for identifying gateways. In
a particular risk characterization process, sources of
information and modes of evaluation will be identified, and these can be further characterized based on
the extent that they inhabit isolated silos. The characterization of specialized silos and, especially, the gaps
between them is pertinent for systemic risks because
they reflect vulnerabilities in the assessment process.
Risks that do not fit well in a particular silo may
be neglected or considered in an unbalanced way.
Silo-induced vulnerability is increased with systemic
risks. Consequentially, different aspects of risk will be
deemed to lie in different conceptual spaces and the
likelihood of imbalance in assessment is that much
greater. An important example is the delayed attention given to so-called “natech risks,” risks associated
with the combined effects of natural hazards and releases from industrial facilities (Cruz & Okada, 2008;
Cruz, Kajitani, & Tatano, 2015). The gaps between
silos also play a direct role in systemic risks through
social amplification/attenuation processes. Messages
from different silos are likely to be incoherent or
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even contradictory. Trust will be diminished, and factionalism is likely.
6.

GOVERNANCE

What can scientists and science institutions do
to contribute to the addressing of systemic risks
when confronted by a multitude of conflicting public
perceptions and inadequate management strategies?
Systemic risks require integrative governance approaches that merge the efforts of many disciplines,
organizations, and agencies. Thus, governance of systemic risks needs to be interdisciplinary and crosssectional (Binot et al., 2015). In addition, it needs
to be inclusive (Renn & Schweizer, 2009). It should
address the differing concerns, interests, perceptions,
and values of many different actors. To help, scientists must be able to participate effectively in suitable
governance processes. They have roles to play both
in developing information and insights that speak to
the wide range of people’s concerns and perceptions,
and in the design and implementation of constructive
participatory arrangements.
One contribution would be the effective creation
as well as cocreation of scenarios and simulations
as tools for anticipating potential harm before it occurs (Breckwoldt, Gruber, & Wittmann, 2014). Our
usual learning mode of trial and error is totally inapt to deal with nonlinear cause–effect chains with
tipping points. However, trial and error as a heuristic is deeply engrained in social learning processes
(Mathew & Perreault, 2015). So, it would be useful
to create simulations in a virtual environment where
participants can learn by trial and error. In these
virtual surroundings, dynamic systems behavior including tipping points can be simulated and people
can experience what it means to trespass these tipping points. These experiences can sensitize people
not to wait for negative feedback before changing
behavior and lifestyles. Yet this method of virtual
preparation for relying on anticipation rather than
trial and error will be effective only when the simulations are framed in a form of a plausible, easy-tograsp, and credible narrative, are accompanied by options and suggestions for personal actions (agency),
and/or collective initiatives of how to avoid disaster
and provide opportunities for users to include their
own preferences and values (Chabay, Koch, Martinez, & Scholz, 2019). The simulations need to be
not only scientifically well designed, but also well
visualized. Adding to the challenge is that the system behavior is influenced by public perceptions and
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communication. Thus, creating sensitivity to social
amplification and its effects is part of the exercise
to anticipate potential impacts before negative feedback is experienced. The task is not trivial and requires a joint effort of modelers, natural scientists,
social scientists, communication specialists, and psychologists. It may even be conductive to include professional writers and science fiction authors. Decision landscapes and thoughtful boundary analyses
can help guide the effort and can facilitate communication between the participants. For instance, we
have used participatory simulation efforts in several
studies of our own (Brukmajster, Hampel, & Renn,
2007; Squires & Renn, 2011). To reform fishing rules
and regulations for the European Union, we installed
a Round Table with major stakeholders, including
representatives from the fishing, the fish processing, and tourism industry as well as environmental
NGOs to develop options for regulations and measures to improve the sustainability of the fishing industry. These options were handed over to two major research groups specialized in ocean life simulations. They included the regulatory options such as
temporary no-fishing zones, early retirement of elder fishermen and women, increasing net-size, and
many others in their simulations and reported the results back to the Round Table. Based on these results,
the stakeholders had time to reflect on the likely impacts of their preferred policy options. They did question the assumptions behind the simulations but once
they understood the fabrics of the simulation methods, they felt empowered to use them constructively
in the discourse. In the end, they all agreed on a set
of measures that were in line with their basic values but also clearly effective in terms of the impacts
revealed by the simulations that were presented to
them.
Another example of such a successful participatory simulation effort is the construction of energy scenarios for Switzerland (Brukmajster et al.,
2007). In this simulation, various stakeholder groups
but also groups of randomly selected citizens were
given the opportunity to change parameters of simulation tools for designing their own preferred energy scenario. The simulation tool enabled them to
acknowledge and consider the functional and causal
relationships between their preferred interventions
and the likely impacts on crucial variables such as
energy security, ecological impacts, and cost for energy services. This method of empowering stakeholders and citizens to use simulations tools for experiencing the likely impacts of different policies and
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articulating their own preferences has been further
developed into so-called “decision theaters” in which
participants design future scenarios aided by prestructured simulations and Artificial Intelligence applications (Boukherroub, D’amours, & Rönnqvist,
2018; Global Climate Forum, 2018; Roach, 1986).
The experiences with participatory modeling and
simulations emphasize the need for inclusive and active participation in collective decision making. Once
people are engaged in making decisions collectively
for their community, they are much more willing and
determined to learn about the complexities in which
they operate (Renn & Schweizer, 2009; 2020). If people are invited to join a Round Table with other citizens, they become aware that their opinion and their
judgment will have an impact on the wellbeing of
the community in which they live and they feel accountable for all the preferences that they have articulated (Landwehr, 2021). Evidence suggests that
people in situation of collective decision making are
(1) more willing to look into more complex relationships and deal prudently with uncertainties and ambiguities (Breckon, Hopkins, & Rickey, 2019), and (2)
willing to resolve conflict by looking into the tradeoffs between different options and consider not only
the consequences for themselves but also for others who ideally are all represented in the discussion
(Niemeyer, 2011). For this to happen we need good
opportunities and open spaces that provide such a
catalytic service to the communities. Social scientists
can help in exploring opportunities for and designing the appropriate institutional structures and processes in which people are encouraged to develop
these civic virtues of evidence-informed and valuebased production of collective decision making (International Risk Governance Council, 2018). Social
scientists can employ decision landscapes effectively
in this effort; they must be sensitive to social amplifying, attenuating, and distorting impacts on perceptions and responses. Thus, social sciences must
be considered an equal partner among other scientific disciplines in risk analysis and risk management
(Kuzma, Grieger, Brown, & Cummings, 2020).
Collective decision making to address systemic
risks effectively will require collaboration among
members of the public, scientists, and other decisionmakers. Scientists are required to mention and
characterize uncertainty, explicitly stress the stochastic nature of what we know, and point out the various ambiguities in the interpretation of complex relationships (Spiegelhalter, 2017). They have the dual
task of communicating what can be known about the
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system and also communicating the justification as
well as the limitations for that description, to make
the boundaries more visible and pronounced in public discourse (Williams & Noyes, 2007). However,
participating scientists must also recognize and acknowledge the limitations of their role as well as in
their knowledge claims. Complexity and uncertainty
mean that not all scientific questions can be fully answered. Moreover, many critical aspects lie outside
the domain of science. People’s values matter for any
decision. Thus, experiential or tacit knowledge, entangled with people’s values must also be respected
(Renn, 2010). Societal values and concerns are essential parameters for decision making. Hence, transdisciplinary approaches toward systemic risk research
are needed (cf. Hirsch Hadorn et al., 2008; Lang et al.,
2012).
7.

CONCLUSIONS

Systemic risks pose more difficult challenges in
risk management and risk governance than do conventional risks. The challenges come partly from attenuated, misguided, and differing perceptions of
risk by the public; they also reflect the very nature of systemic risks in terms of their complexity, uncertainty, and ambiguity. These challenges
are sufficiently severe that they are unlikely to be
met in a comprehensive manner. There are, however, prospects for substantial progress with significant benefits. Achieving progress will require, among
other demands, sustained commitment and effort by
scientists and scientific institutions. We want to emphasize several insights expressed in our article. One
major obstacle for bridging the gap between the acknowledgment of systemic risk as a serious challenge
and the lack of effective actions that are required
to deal with these risks effectively is the likelihood
of risk attenuation in the public discourse. This phenomenon can be explained by specific heuristics and
biases of how most people perceive these risks. In this
article, we identified several factors that can lead toward attenuation.
First, most complex systemic risks run counter to
our intuition that serious dangers are caused by factors close in space and time. Anything that appears
“far-fetched” is also seen as less plausible and obvious than risks where we can immediately recognize
the driver in time and space.
Second, science cannot provide deterministic
and nonambiguous models for systemic risks. People tend to find information that is associated with
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uncertainty and ambiguity not very credible, even
when the information is based on sound scientific
analysis.
Third, effective governance measures require
trust in scientific assessments even if they are not obvious to people or reconfirmed by their personal experience. To rely on information that only scientists
can provide and that individuals outside of science
cannot test by their own means causes a lot of tension. Distrust in science is still not widespread but
depending on the issue can increase substantially (examples in Kabat, 2017). Furthermore, as most people
are unable to prove the correctness of scientific arguments in a public debate, they tend to use cues for
assigning trustworthiness or credibility. Since these
cues change over time and are often contradictory,
people can feel irritated and frustrated and then prefer inaction rather than risking doing the wrong or
the inappropriate thing.
Fourth, misrepresentation of systemic risk is easily reinforced by digital communication tools which
bolster echo chambers in public discourse. Consequently, knowledge camps become polarized and differentiated approaches that are crucial for dealing
with systemic risks become marginalized.
It is difficult for scientists to work and communicate effectively in settings where these triggers of
risk perception prevail. But that is the challenge scientists must meet. There are two types of tasks. One
is helping to design and implement suitable collective
decision-making processes and institutions which can
encourage joint problem analysis. The other is combining analysis with communication, characterizing
systemic risks collaboratively so that attenuated perceptions are not triggered, and so that decisionmakers and the public can understand, reflect, and make
prudent choices about actions.
The three tools described in Section 5 can help
scientists perform these tasks. Decision landscapes
coupled with boundary analyses will help in identifying the communities, entities, and interests that
should be represented in decision-making processes.
Decision landscapes with attention to boundaries
and gateways will provide structure to facilitate systemic risk characterization. They can also be used as
communication aids in collaborative discussion.
Systemic risks can cause devastating impacts.
When attenuated risk perceptions of the public are
a barrier to effective action, the risk itself is amplified. Considerable risk reduction is feasible, but it
will require acknowledging the barriers created by
attenuated and distorted perceptions, assessing their
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impact, and then making the substantial efforts to
cope with those barriers.
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